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14.1  Introduction 
The precarious economic position of families headed by women and the 
explosive growth in the number of such families over the past two decades 
are well known. The women and children of these families constitute a 
disproportionate share of  the poverty population and of welfare recipi- 
ents; in the minds of some recent analysts, they also account for a large 
number of the members of America’s “underclass.” Although much has 
been discovered from cross-sectional surveys about the status of female- 
and male-headed families in the past few years, there is considerably less 
information about the dynamics of one of  the most important events- 
divorce and separation-that  produce families headed  by women  and 
about the nature of the adjustment process that takes place following a di- 
vorce or separation. Simple comparisons of  families headed by married 
men with those headed by women ignore the selection process that leads 
some women to head their own families, and are apt to be a poor guide to 
the likely changes in the economic situation of a currently married woman 
if  she were to divorce or of a currently unmarried woman if she were to 
marry. 
More sophisticated attempts to gauge the economic consequences of di- 
vorce and remarriage have either estimated multiequation  models with 
cross-sectional data (Danziger et al. 1982) or have used longitudinal data 
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) (Hoffman 1977; Bane 
and Weiss  1980; Weiss, forthcoming) and National Longitudinal Surveys 
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(Nestel, Mercier, and Shaw 1982). Although based on smaller numbers of 
observations, longitudinal data make it possible to compare the economic 
status of the same individuals before and after such events as divorce and 
remarriage, thus providing the opportunity to look at the effects of persis- 
tent interpersonal differences, even if those crucial characteristics are not 
measured. 
Longitudinal data solve some but by no means all of the modeling prob- 
lems inherent in estimating the consequences of changes in marital status. 
The first attempts to use PSID data to assess the economic consequences 
of  divorce (Hoffman 1977; and Holmes 1976) fixed the time period over 
which changes in economic status were measured and counted all divorces 
that occurred at any time in the interval. As a result, income changes were 
measured at varying lengths of time after the divorce or separation and 
thus were not easily interpreted. 
In this chapter we  extend the uses of the longitudinal data from the 
PSID to  provide a more complete analysis of the income and labor supply 
changes that accompany divorce and remarriage. We use a method devel- 
oped by Bane and Weiss in which divorces are observed over a period of 
several years; then data on income sources and labor supply are “lined 
up” around the divorce year. This procedure not only increases sample 
size compared to a single year-something  that is crucial for a relatively 
rare event like divorce-but  also provides a uniform time interval to as- 
sess the economic conditions and adjustments in the years just after a di- 
vorce. 
Other important features of our descriptive analysis that distinguish it 
from past work are the following: 
Previous studies have largely ignored the fact that many divorced peo- 
ple remarry,  causing a vast  improvement  in their  economic situation. 
More than 50 percent of divorced white women and considerably less than 
that fraction of black women remarry within five years following their di- 
vorce. The economic status of women who do not remarry is a potentially 
unreliable guide to the situation women are likely to encounter should 
they happen to divorce. Our approach integrates the probability of remar- 
riage into an analysis of the economic consequences of divorce. 
Unlike Weiss and Bane and Weiss, we have not limited our postdivorce 
samples to  single-parent families. Instead, we use as separate analysis sub- 
groups men, women, and children involved in divorce, as well as a com- 
parison group of intact couples. 
We adopt functional definitions of marriage and divorce, the former in- 
cluding instances where unmarried couples are living together and the lat- 
ter covering cases where residential separation occurs without divorce, or 
where unmarried couples who had been living together have separated. 
Unlike Weiss  (forthcoming),  we  were  able to identify and include in- 429  Economic Consequences of Marital Instability 
stances where both the divorce and remarriage occurred within the same 
year. 
Like Weiss’s study, our analysis focuses on the distributional conse- 
quences of marital dissolution by carrying out separate analyses of white 
women from the upper and lower halves of the family income distribu- 
tion. Unlike Weiss, however, we choose a different year in which to define 
the high- and low-income segments than that used as a base year for mea- 
surement of predivorce economic status. There are truncation problems 
with Weiss’s procedure which lead to an overstatement of the distributional 
consequences of divorce. 
Since the economic situation of women and children involved in divorce 
depends crucially upon the event of remarriage, we focus a great deal of 
attention in this chapter on the process and consequences of remarriage. 
To address the policy questions of whether anything can be done to in- 
crease remarriage rates of women, especially black women, we must un- 
derstand the process of remarriage and learn whether programs such as 
AFDC play a role in discouraging remarriage, why remarriage rates are 
lower for black than white women, and whether the experience of women 
who do  remarry is a reliable guide to the likely economic benefits marriage 
would bring for women who are currently choosing not to remarry. Inves- 
tigation of the latter point is fraught with potential problems of selection 
bias, and we develop and estimate a model of the likely improvement in 
status that adjusts for this consideration. Although sample-size limita- 
tions prevent us from estimating the selection effect with precision, we do 
find evidence that the likely favorable income consequences  of remarriage 
are much smaller for women who had not remarried than for otherwise 
similar women who had remarried. 
This introduction is the first of a total of six sections. Section 14.2 sum- 
marizes the general framework that guides our approach. In the third sec- 
tion the sample and data are described. The fourth section presents a de- 
scriptive analysis of  the income and labor supply flows that surround 
divorce and separation for the men, women, and children concerned. The 
fifth section details our modeling and estimation of the likely gains associ- 
ated with remarriage for women who have divorced. The results are sum- 
marized in the sixth section. 
14.2  Framework 
It is easy to understand why the economic consequences  of divorce may 
be especially adverse for women and children. In most cases children re- 
main with the mother, who has considerably less capacity for earning a 
generous income in the labor market than her former husband, partly be- 
cause her responsibilities for the children may reduce her labor supply. 430  Greg J. Duncan/Saul D.  Hoffman 
Alimony and child support are the principal mechanisms for transfers 
from the ex-husband to  the ex-wife, but the frequency and amount of pay- 
ments rarely make up for an appreciable amount of the labor income lost 
through the departure of the ex-husband (US.  Bureau of the Census 
1983). Human capital investments on the part of the mother are one way 
in which the economic situation of her family may be improved, but the 
main route to financial betterment for her has been remarriage. 
As pointed out by Hutchens (1979), striking parallels exist between the 
process of divorce, remarriage, and “marital search” on the one hand, 
and job change and job search on  the other. That comparison suggests one 
crucial but frequently overlooked idea. Although the short-run economic 
impact of unemployment and job search may be severe, unemployment is 
rarely permanent. Just as it would be inappropriate to assess the economic 
impact of job change by focusing exclusively on the period of unemploy- 
ment between jobs or on a sample of permanently unemployed persons, it 
is equally inappropriate to ignore the possibility of remarriage in an anal- 
ysis of the economic consequences of divorce. Many studies of the conse- 
quences of divorce do that, however, by focusing exclusively on a sample 
of still-divorced women. We do not mean to minimize the adverse eco- 
nomic situation of women and children involved in a divorce or separa- 
tion. Indeed, as pointed out by Bane and Weiss (1980), a five-year spell of 
female headship may be a relatively short period in the life of the female 
head but it constitutes a major portion of the time that her children spend 
in their childhood. Adverse economic circumstances in childhood may 
leave lifetime scars. Nevertheless, an evenhanded assessment of the eco- 
nomic consequences of divorce should take account of the probability of 
remarriage and the economic gains associated with it. 
These ideas are illustrated in figure 14.1 which shows hypothetical in- 
come flows surrounding a divorce or separation. Suppose that economic 
status is measured by family income, adjusted for family size and compo- 
sition; call this measurement family income/needs. ’ If a couple remains 
married, some growth in economic status over time is likely, accompany- 
ing additional investments in human and financial capital. This growth is 
illustrated  by the line labeled  “continuously  married” in figure  14.1. 
Some couples will choose to divorce or separate, however, and that event 
will likely entail a substantial decline in economic status for the ex-wife 
and children. But within any fixed period of time there is the possibility 
that the ex-wife will remarry and substantially improve her economic sta- 
tus. For a woman whose new spouse is more capable than the former one, 
the economic circumstances associated with remarriage may well be high- 
er than the status that would have resulted from continuing the first mar- 
riage. If remarriage is a random event among divorced women, then the 
1. Nonmoney income should be included in this analysis as well but it is ignored here and 
in the empirical sections of  the paper. 431  Economic Consequences of  Marital Instability 
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Fig. 14.1.  Hypothetical levels of family incomeheeds associated with 
divorce and remarriage. 
expected economic situation following a divorce is the expected value of 
the income flows associated with the states of remarriage and no remar- 
riage. Shown in figure 14.1 are expected values, associated with remar- 
riage probabilities, that increase linearly with time from 0 to .5 over the 
first five years following divorce or separation. 
Measuring status changes immediately after a divorce is likely to over- 
state considerably its longer-run effects because the measurement mini- 
mizes the chances of remarriage and thus its likely beneficial economic ef- 
fects.  It  would  be  preferable  to take  an expected-value approach  to 
economic status that weights the remarriage situation by the probability of 
occurrence. A crucial aspect of this procedure, however, is that remarriage 
may not be a random event across groups with different characteristics. 
Racial differences in remarriage rates are well known (Thornton and Rod- 
gers 1983), and there may well be crucial but typically unmeasured charac- 
teristics of divorced spouses that affect remarriage chances. These issues 
are addressed in section 14.5 of the paper. 
14.3  Data and Subsamples 
The analysis presented in this paper was conducted on data from the 
Panel Study of.  Income Dynamics. The PSID provides a continuous repre- 432  Greg J. Duncan/Saul D. Hoffman 
sentative sample of individuals in the population of the United States (ex- 
cept for recent immigrants), and thus also a representative subsample of 
adults and children undergoing a divorce or separation. All of the descrip- 
tive analyses reported here are estimated with sample weights that adjust 
both for differential initial sampling fractions and for differential non- 
response. 
Samples were drawn from the fourteen-year family-individual file, cov- 
ering the period from 1967 to 1981. The sample of  women undergoing a 
divorce or separation was limited to sample women between the ages of 
twenty-five and fifty-four in the year prior to the divorce. A divorce or 
separation was defined as the transition from a state of living with a hus- 
band or long-term partner to a state of not living with that same person. 
Changes due to the death of  a husband were excluded from the analysis. 
Remarriages are defined by the acquisition of  a new husband or partner. 
The sample of men was drawn with analogous restrictions.* Correspond- 
ing criteria on  their parents were used to determine the sample of children. 
The group of children was restricted to sample children who were between 
the ages of one and five in the year prior to the divorce.’ The sample of 
children was further restricted to exclude those who were living with nei- 
ther parent. In about one-tenth  of the included cases, the children re- 
mained with the father rather than the mother after the divorce. 
These samples were selected by scanning adjacent pairs of years from 
1969-70 to 1975-76 for divorces or separations. Where there were multi- 
ple occurrences, the first such instance was taken. The first year of the ad- 
jacent pair in which a divorce or separation occurred was designated as 
year  t.  Income and employment information was then compiled from 
years t -  2 through year t + 5.  References to these years in this paper con- 
cern statistics for the calendar year rather than for the interviewing year in 
which they were reported. Because the three subsamples of individuals in- 
volved in divorce are selected through a procedure that pools the data of 
various sets of  years and because no marked differences in the incidence 
of divorces occurred over the business cycle, macroeconomic influences 
are averaged over all the relevant years.4 
The sample of intact couples consists of all couples who were married 
continuously from 1971 to 1977, where the wife was between the ages of 
2.  Note that identical age restrictions on  the sample of divorcing men and women will 
cause some ex-husbands to be included in the sample of men without their ex-wives being in- 
cluded in the sample of women, and vice versa. 
3.  Since the measurement of economic status extends for seven years, the age range for 
children was set narrowly to avoid situations in which the children would be old enough to 
set up independent households by the end of the measurement period. 
4. The fraction of all divorces observed for the seven years between 1969 and 1975 were 
.168, .145, .120, .124, .C94, .170, and .184, respectively.  The largest fractions are indeed as- 
sociated with the recession years of 1974 and 1975, but the third largest is associated with 
1969, a period of exceptionally  low unemployment and high growth. 433  Economic Consequences of Marital instability 
twenty-five and fifty-four in 1971. For these couples, years t - 1 through 
t + 5 correspond to calendar years 1971 through 1977. Note that this span 
of years includes the severe recession of 1974 through 1976 (years t + 2 
through t  + 4, respectively) and thus provides some information about 
how income flows among intact couples are affected by macroeconomic 
fluctuations. All dollar figures have been inflated to 1981 prices using the 
Consumer Price Index. Contributions to the support of  dependents out- 
side the household have been subtracted from the family incomes of the 
subsample of men who have been divorced or separated. 
As shown in the appendix in table 14.A.  1, the resulting female subsam- 
ple included 349 divorced or separated women, of whom 140 were black. 
Separate analyses are presented below by race and, for white women only, 
according to whether family income in year t -  2 was above or below the 
unweighted median.s Comparable distinctions are made for the subsam- 
ples of  men, children, and intact couples. We also present separate calcu- 
lations for women who remained divorced or separated in each year and 
for all of the initially divorced women, regardless of whether they had re- 
married. As table 14.A.2 shows, remarriage rates for all groups are sub- 
stantial-for  women they are about 20 percent after one year and over 50 
percent  after five  years.  Black remarriage  rates are always lower than 
white rates.6 
14.4  Descriptive Analysis 
14.4.1 
The most dramatic economic effects of marital instability show up as 
changes in the total family income of  the women and children involved. 
These changes are detailed  in the appendix  in tables  14.A.3 through 
14.A.6 and are summarized in figure 14.2, which shows time profiles of 
income relative to year f - 1 for four groups-intact  couples, divorced 
women who remained unmarried, and all divorced women and men re- 
Changes in Total Family Income 
5.  This division (at $23,000 in 1982 prices) is based on the year t - 2 because truncation 
on income in t - 1 would bias the analysis of income changes between year f - 1 and subse- 
quent years. 
6.  The remarriage rates for whites are remarkably similar to those calculated from the 
June 1980 Current Population Survey’s retrospective marital histories. Thornton and Rod- 
gers 1983 calculated annual remarriage probabilities for white women, less than forty-five 
years of age, who separated between 1970 and 1974. Their figures, with comparable PSID 
figures in parentheses are: .22 (.21),  .34 (.33),  .43 (.46), .49 (.49), and 35  (.54).  Comparable 
figures for blacks are not nearly as well matched: .05 (.18),  .08 (.28),  .12 (.31), .17 (.32), .20 
(.42).  A notable difference in the procedures used in computing these figures is that the CPS 
asks about official remarriages and the PSID does not distinguish between official remar- 
riages and “living-together”  situations. Thornton and Rodgers also note that there is sub- 
stantial disagreement between the CPS figures and vital statistics calculated from official 
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Fig. 14.2.  Family income of selected groups after a divorce or separation 
as a fraction of family income for the year prior to the divorce 
or separation. 
gardless of their marital status in each subsequent year. Changes in a pre- 
ferred measure of family economic status-total  family income relative to 
needs-are  described in the following section. 
The average income level of women who divorce or separate falls from 
more than $26,000 in the year prior to divorce to less than $15,000 in the 
first full year after the divorce (table 14.A.3,  row 4,  cols.  1 and 2). Ex- 
pressed as a fraction of  family income in year t -  1 (table 14.A.4,  row 4, 435  Economic Consequences of Marital Instability 
col. 2 and figure 14.2), their income falls to 70 percent of its predivorce 
level in year t + 1 and, if they do not remarry, remains at about that level 
thereafter.’ The 70 percent figure compares with 73 percent for children 
living with a parent who remained divorced in the first year following the 
divorce, 93 percent for men who divorced,8  and 117 percent for intact cou- 
ples.  The relative drop for above-median white women and for black 
women is especially large.9 
A closer look at the distribution of these ratios (tables 14.A.5 and 
14.A.6) confirms the drastic drop in income for women (and their chil- 
dren) who remain divorced or separated after a year; over 40 percent of 
each group had family incomes cut by more than one-half (table 14.A.5, 
col. 1). Only about one-sixth of the divorced or separated men experienced 
so drastic a drop. Virtually none of the intact couples (2 percent) suffer 
such a fall, even during the recession years oft  + 2 through t + 4.  lo While 
some of the women and children did actually experience an increase in real 
total family income between these two years (table 14.A.6, col.  l), the 
fractions who did so (1 1 and 15 percent, respectively) were smaller than 
comparable fractions for divorced or separated men (30 percent) and 
much smaller than for intact couples (65 percent). The relative decline in 
income was particularly severe for blacks and for women and children 
with family incomes above the median prior to the divorce. 
The right-hand  columns  of  the  appendix  tables  show  the  income 
amounts and ratios for all individuals involved in divorce or separation, 
regardless of whether they had remarried. Including the possibility of re- 
marriage dramatically improves the picture of  the average postdivorce 
economic situation of women and children. More than one-fifth of the 
women and children involved in divorce remarried within one year, and 
their improved economic status raised the average ratio of post- to pre- 
divorce family income from .70 to .81 for women and from .73 to .85 for 
children. 
7.  The average of the individual ratios does not equal the ratio of the average income lev- 
els because the distribution of the individual ratios is skewed to the right. There is a natural 
truncation of these ratios from below at zero. Although a truncation from above was im- 
posed at the value of  5.0, there is still enough skewness in this distribution to place the mean 
well above the median. 
8.  None of the calculations for the divorced or separated men distinguish between those 
who remarried and those who remained divorced or separated. 
9.  As large as the drop is for the above-median white women, it would be even larger if, as 
with Weiss (forthcoming), t -  1 had been the year used for stratification of the white women 
into the two income groups. Transitory increases in income in year t - 1 will push some of 
the women into the above-median group and lead to large decreases in income between t -  1 
and t + 1. The ratio of  t + 1 family income to t -  2 family income for the above-median 
white women was 51. 
10.  Recall that the divorced samples were drawn from a pooling procedure that roughly 
averages macroeconomic fluctuations across all years. Income information  for the intact 
couples covers the years 1971-77, with years t + 2 through f + 4 corresponding to calendar 
years 1974 through 1976. 436  Greg J. Duncan/Saul D. Hoffman 
As shown in figure 14.2, family income of the women averages 97 per- 
cent of its predivorce level by the third year; after five years, when more 
than half  had  remarried, income rises above the predivorce level.  Of 
course, these averages conceal great diversity in the experiences of sub- 
groups. Few of the women and children who were not involved in a remar- 
riage improved their status. And remarriage rates are substantially lower 
for black women and children, causing their average status to improve 
much more slowly than that of whites. The final columns of tables 14.A.3 
through  14.A.6 show that the economic position of white women and 
children who were involved in a remarriage is often close to the t + 5 posi- 
tion of intact couples. The economic status of black women and children 
involved in a remarriage is considerably below that of intact black cou- 
ples. 
Taken together, the flat relative income profile of continuously unmar- 
ried women and the rising profile for all women clearly shows the relative 
unimportance of human capital adjustments relative to remarriage as a 
means to improved economic status. The important tasks of understand- 
ing why remarriage occurs in some cases but not in others and why the 
rates are lower for blacks is taken up in the fifth section of this paper. 
14.4.2  Changes in Income/Needs and Poverty 
Family income relative to needs is a preferred measure of family eco- 
nomic status because it adjusts for the number and composition of family 
members relying on family income. The need standard used here is the of- 
ficial government poverty standard, which takes into account family size 
and the ages and sex of family members. Incomeheeds is a simple ratio of 
total family cash income to this needs level. 
It is expected that adjustments for family size will show a somewhat 
more optimistic picture of the economic status changes that accompany 
divorce for women and children,  since the ex-husband’s needs are no 
longer met. Figures 14.3 and 14.4 and tables  14.A.7 through  14.A.11 
show that this is indeed the case. Family income/needs drops to  87 percent 
of its predivorce level for women who are still divorced in t + 1 and to 84 
percent of its prior level for children in such situations (table 14.A.8, col. 
2, rows 4 and 12). The comparable declines in family income from t -  1 to 
t + 1 for still-divorced women and children were to 70 percent and 73 per- 
cent, respectively, of their former average levels. The average adult man 
who became divorced or separated was actually better off one year later, 
although the improvements in his situation were less than that experienced 
by the average couple that remained intact. 
As with family income, the relative drop in family incomeheeds is par- 
ticularly severe for black women and children and for white women and 
children with predivorce income levels above the median. Also as with 
family income, including in the calculations women and children involved 437  Economic Consequences of Marital Instability 
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Fig. 14.3.  Family incomeheeds of women after divorce or separation as 
a fraction of family incomeheeds for the year prior to divorce 
or separation. 
in a marriage improves their average position so much that virtually all of 
the groups are better off, on average, by the fifth year following the di- 
vorce or separation than they were before it. The average, of  course, in- 
cludes those who did remarry (the majority of whom are better off eco- 
nomically) and those who did not remarry (the majority of  whom are 
worse of€) (tables 14.A.9,  14.A.10). 438  Greg J. DuncanISaul D. Hoffman 
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Fig. 14.4.  Family incomeheeds of  selected groups after divorce or 
separation as a fraction of  family incomeheeds for the year 
prior to divorce or separation. 
Poverty rates rise dramatically for women and children involved in di- 
vorce or separation but actually fall slightly for men who divorce (figure 
14.5 and table 14.A.11).  A  closer look at the distribution of the poverty 
figures shows that the higher incidence is limited almost exclusively to 
black women and children and to white women and children whose pre- 
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Fig. 14.5.  Incidence of  poverty among intact couples and men, women, 
and children involved  in divorce or separation. 
these two groups are large indeed. Poverty rates for below-median white 
children jump from .14 in the year prior to the divorce to .41 in the year 
after (table 14.A.11,  row  10,  cols.  1 and 2). Comparable increases for 
black children are from .24 to .38. The situation of the white children im- 
proves substantially with time, even if no remarriage occurs, but poverty 
rates at the end of the period are still higher than they were before the di- 
vorce. Poverty rate changes are similar for women involved in divorce, al- 
though the absolute fractions for poor women are uniformly lower than 
the comparable fractions for children. 
14.4.3  Changes in the Composition of  Family Income: Earnings, 
Welfare, Alimony and Child Support 
The composition of family income changes drastically for the women 
and children involved in divorce, as only part of the ex-husband's lost la- 440  Greg J. Duncan/Saul D. Hoffman 
bor income is retained in the form of alimony and child support payments 
and the wife’s own labor income, welfare, and transfers from others out- 
side the household adjust in response to the change. 
An examination of these various sources for the PSID subsamples of 
women and children clearly shows that the wife’s own labor income is the 
dominant component for most of these new families. Of the $14,781 aver- 
age family income level of divorced or separated women in the year fol- 
lowing the divorce (table 14.A.2, row 4, col. 2), about three-fifths was the 
wife’s labor income (table 14.A.12, row 12, col. 2), only about one-tenth 
consisted of alimony and child support (table 14.A.13, row 12, col. 2), 
about one-twentieth consisted of welfare income (table 14.A.14, row 12, 
col. 2), and only about 1 percent consisted of other private transfers from 
outside of the household (data not shown).” 
The composition of the income packages is somewhat different across 
the racial and income subgroups and changes somewhat over time. Not 
surprisingly, welfare is  considerably more  important  for  low-income 
whites and for blacks, while alimony and child support is somewhat more 
important for higher-income white women and children. For all of these 
groups, however, the ex-wife’s labor income constitutes more than 60 per- 
cent of the total, on average, and the importance of this income source in- 
creases with time. 
Labor Supply and Labor Income 
The labor force participation of women increases dramatically in re- 
sponse to divorce. The fractions of women working at least 1  ,OOO  hours in 
the year after a divorce is more than twenty percentage points higher than 
the fractions performing a comparable amount of market work in the 
year prior to  the divorce. The size of this increase is almost identical for all 
three subgroups of women (figure 14.6 and table 14.A.12, rows 5 to 8). 
Virtually all of the divorced white women coming from above-median in- 
come families were working at least 250 hours in the year following the di- 
vorce and 85 percent worked at least 1,000 hours. The comparable frac- 
tions of black women and below-median white women working at least 
250 hours are 65 and 72 percent, respectively. There is some tendency for 
the participation rates to increase with time for the women who remain di- 
vorced or separated. In contrast, women who remarry end up with partici- 
pation rates that are not only lower than when they were divorced, but 
also lower than in the year prior to the divorce.12  Labor income amounts 
associated with these work hours show a similar pattern (table 14.A. 12, 
rows 9 to 12). 
11. Private transiers from others outside the household never averaged more than $400 
for  any of the subgroups and do not appear in any of the appendix tables. 
12.  This latter fact raises the possibility that many women may increase their participa- 
tion rates in anticipation of an upcoming divorce. Annual average work hours did increase 
between t -  2 and t - 1, but only by a modest amount-32  hours. 441  Economic Consequences of Marital Instability 
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Fig. 14.6.  Labor supply adjustments of women after a divorce or 
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Alimony and Child Support 
Even though more than half of the white children involved in divorce 
lived in families in which alimony or child support was received (table 
14.A.13, rows 5 and 6, col. 2), the average amount of  income from this 
source never amounted to more than one-fifth of total family income for 
either high- or low-income white women and children. It is even less im- 
portant for black women and children. Although the average amounts of 
this income do differ, there are surprisingly minor differences in the frac- 
tions of high- and low-income women and children who receive it, espe- 
cially several years following the divorce. The fractions of  high-income 
women and children receiving alimony or child support declines sharply 
over time, even among those not involved in a remarriage. Comparable 
fractions for low-income white women and children show little trend over 
time; by the fifth year following the divorce or separation, similar frac- 
tions of  still unmarried women and their children from the two income 
groups report receiving income from that source. 
Welfare 
The receipt of welfare income following a divorce or separation is limited 
almost  exclusively to low-income  white  and  to black  families  (table 
14.A.14, rows 1-8, col. 2). Close to  half of black women and children and 
between one-third and one-half of the low-income white women and chil- 
dren report receiving at least $250 in income from AFDC, general assis- 
tance, or any other noncontributory cash welfare income program in the 
year following the divorce. Remarriage often ends the spell of welfare re- 
ceipt for the women and children who are involved in a remarriage. And 
there is a discernable drop in the incidence of  welfare income receipt 
among the low-income white families but not among the black women 
and children. 
14.5  Modeling the Gains to Remarriage 
The previous sections have documented the pervasive economic impact 
of both divorce and remarriage. One potential shortcoming of this analy- 
sis, however, is that it treats marital status itself as exogenous. Implicitly, 
it suggests that the economic consequences actually experienced by per- 
sons who become divorced or who remarried would also apply to those 
persons who did not undergo those changes. That is an important pre- 
sumption, since, in evaluating policy measures that might reduce divorce 
or encourage remarriage, the results of  descriptive exercises like those 
above are often utilized. 
There are, in fact, several reasons to  suggest that that presumption may 
not hold. Suppose that, following Wolf (1977) and Danziger et al. (1982), 443  Economic Consequences of Marital Instability 
we view choices about marital status as a function of the expected utility 
levels associated with being married or single. In neither case, of course, is 
utility solely a function of income, but ceteris paribus, it seems reasonable 
that a sample of divorced persons would consist largely of those who expe- 
rienced relatively smaller income losses. Similarly, those who remarry 
may also be a nonrandom set of all divorced persons, in this case including 
those who had the most to gain economically from remarriage. In either 
case, inferences drawn from descriptions that treat the samples as if they 
were random would be in error. If  the selection processes were as de- 
scribed above, the economic consequences of divorce would be under- 
stated and those of remarriage would be overstated-at  least as far as 
drawing inferences to the rest of the population was concerned. 
In this section we focus more carefully on issues of this kind. Specifi- 
cally, we examine two related issues. First, we  now treat the choice of 
marital status as endogenous. We restrict this analysis to the transition in 
marital status for women from divorced to married. Second, we  reexa- 
mine the expected income consequences of remarriage, explicitly account- 
ing for the potential nonrepresentativeness of that sample. To do that, we 
utilize the sample selection techniques developed by Heckman (1979). 
4.5.1  A Simple Model of the Gains from Remarriage 
Our basic ideas can be sketched as follows. Let Q stand for “husband 
quality,” a concept analogous to Becker’s child quality. We think of Q as 
having two components: potential labor market earnings (Y) and all else 
(A).I3  Q is an increasing function of both Y  and A, but some components 
of A  can be negative. We  assume that a divorced woman seeks a new 
spouse of highest Q, but that this maximum Q value is conditional on her 
own personal characteristics. There may, for example, be certain personal 
characteristics of a divorced woman that enable her to acquire a spouse of 
higher quality. Letting Qi* be the maximum husband quality available to 
woman i and Xi  be the set of her relevant personal characteristics, we can 
express this as: 
Presumably, remarriage occurs only if  it is expected to increase utility. A 
minimum condition for this is V(Q)  > 0; a stronger one, which accounts 
13.  In  the model developed by Danziger et al. 1982, Y  is one of the components of the ex- 
pected earned income of the female household if the woman were to marry. The authors do 
not distinguish between her own  labor income in the married state and the earned income of 
the husband, and they note, but do not incorporate,  the possibility of selection  bias in the es- 
timation of this earned income component in their statistical analysis. Our analysis can be 
thought of as an elaboration upon one aspect of  their model. The size of the future hus- 
band’s labor income in the income package of married women is so large, however, that it is 
certainly the most important component and deserves a careful and separate analysis. 444  Greg J. Duncan/Saul D. Hoffman 
for the fact that some income sources (I,)  are withdrawn at remarriage, 
would be that: 
(2)  U(Q)  > Ws). 
AFDC and alimony payments would be examples of I,.  Since from equa- 
tion (I),  Qi* is a function of Xi,  equations (1) and (2) together suggest that 
a woman’s characteristics  determine  not  only the maximum  husband 
quality available to  her, but also the probability of remarriage. 
If all of the elements of Xi  could be measured, equation (1) could be 
estimated by an OLS regression of Q* on Xi  for a sample of women who 
remarried. The results would be unbiased estimates of population para- 
meters and would be appropriate for the sample of unmarried women as 
well. If, however, some relevant portions of X are not observable, estima- 
tion problems arise, since the unobserved components would affect not 
only the value of Q* but also the probability that an individual would fall 
into the sample of remarried  women. That is precisely the problem of 
selection bias; coefficient estimates derived from such a sample could no 
longer be meaningfully applied to the population  as a whole or, more 
importantly, to the sample of unmarried women. 
The well-known  statistical  solution  to this  problem,  developed  by 
Heckman  (1979),  involves estimating  the sample selection process-in 
this case, remarriage-with  a probit  function.  l4 Those results are then 
used to form the inverse Mill’s ratio denoted as X for each individual in the 
sample of unmarried women. Finally, the equation of interest-our  equa- 
tion (1)-can  be estimated by OLS withk included as an additional regres- 
sor. The sign of the coefficient on  X depends on the correlation of the error 
terms across equations. In this example, a positive (negative) coefficient 
would indicate that a woman who did not remarry would have a lower 
(higher) quality husband (if she were to remarry) than an otherwise identi- 
cal woman (in terms of measured characteristics) who did remarry. A con- 
ventional t-test on the estimated coefficient on fi can be used to assess its 
statistical significance. 
4.5.2  Model Specification 
Although the model outlined above was cast in terms of husband qual- 
ity, broadly defined, we focus in our empirical work only on the new hus- 
band’s labor market earnings. There are two reasons for this. An obvious 
one is the lack of data on the components of A.  While nonmonetary char- 
acteristics may well be important, we have no measures of them. The sec- 
ond justification is that the spouse’s income is important as a means of es- 
caping from poverty and increasing the family’s standard of living. 
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Our full empirical model examines both the probability of  remarriage 
and the labor income of the new spouse over a five-year period beginning 
with the onset of a divorce. The sample of women who divorce or separate 
is drawn from the.PSID data and is identical to  the one used in the descrip- 
tive analyses. The regression results we report are unweighted, although 
we use weighted means to make population  projection^.'^ 
Remarriage Equation 
The dependent variable in our remarriage equation is whether the ini- 
tially divorced or separated woman remarried within five years after the 
divorce or separation.16 The specification of  the independent  variables 
follows Hutchens (1979). All explanatory variables included in Xapply to 
the woman: her educational attainment, health status (whether disabled), 
age, number of children, whether a child is less than age six, and dummy 
variables for whether she resided in large and small SMSAs. As measures 
of I,, we use annual alimony income and monthly AFDC payments for a 
family of four in the state of residence.l’ We expect both of these to  reduce 
the probability of remarriage.  We  also include a time trend to examine 
whether remarriage probability is different for more recent instances of 
divorce. Finally, we conclude after some preliminary experimentation that 
it is appropriate to pool black and white women using only an additive 
race variable (black = l), but no interactions between race and any of the 
independent variables. 
We think that our use of  the data set is an improvement over previous 
work in several respects. First, the five-year time period for remarriage is 
more precise than the variable-length periods used in other studies. This 
time period is long enough for ample search to  have occurred and thus al- 
lows us to assume that an equilibrium situation with respect to remarriage 
is being observed. Second, our analysis includes women in all fifty states; 
previous studies (Hutchens 1979) included only women in selected states 
or were unable to identify the exact state of residence (Danziger et al. 
15.  We used the method outlined in DuMouchel and Duncan 1983 to determine whether 
weighting was necessary. Sample weights, which are the inverse of the probability of sample 
selection, are always required for estimates of population means. 
16. This specification of  the dependent variable does lead to the loss of information con- 
cerning the time of remarriage within the five-year period.  A potentially richer estimation 
technique that would require the imposition of assumptions about the distribution of com- 
pleted spells longer than five years is event history analysis, developed by Tuma, Hannan, 
and Groeneveld 1979. 
17. The data were taken from information published by the Department of Health, Edu- 
cation, and Welfare on the “largest amount paid for basic needs.” Since women without chil- 
dren are ineligible for AFDC, we reassigned their potential AFDC payments to zero. 
Region variables  are excluded from the model because of  the strong correlation with 
AFDC payment levels. Over half of the variation in AFDC levels was accounted for by three 
region dummy variables in an OLS regression. Although urbanhral  measures may reflect 
remarriage opportunities, we see no similar argument for the inclusion of region variables. 446  Greg J. Duncan/Saul D. Hoffman 
1982). Finally, unlike all previous studies, all of the women in our sample 
are observed as of the beginning of a spell of divorce or separation. Pre- 
vious studies have not been able to control for the length of a divorce spell 
and this may have affected their findings. 
New Husband’s Labor Income Equation 
Ideally, the dependent measure of new husband’s earnings capacity in 
our regression analysis should be his expected permanent labor market 
earnings. Lacking that, we use the natural logarithm of the new husband’s 
labor income in the fifth year after her divorce or separation; for women 
who were remarried and divorced within the five-year period, we use the 
new husband’s labor income in the last observed year of remarriage.  The 
independent variables include all of the variables from the remarriage 
equation except the time trend. A set of three dichotomous variables for 
region of  residence is added, as is a measure of  the labor income of  each 
woman’s previous husband. We interpret this variable as a proxy for her 
own unobservable characteristic that might affect the income of her new 
spouse. We continue to use only a dummy variable for race. 
Table 14.1 presents the results of our analyses. Estimated coefficients 
from the probit model are in column (1)’ those from an OLS regression of 
husband’s labor income are in column (2), and the adjusted OLS results, 
correcting for selection bias, are in column (3). 
The remarriage equation is of interest both in its own right and as a pre- 
lude to the regression analysis. Considering the relatively small sample 
size and the inherent problems  in modeling such a complex event, the 
equation performs well. Two sets of results are of special interest. First, 
the two financial variables-AFDC  payments and alimony-reduce  the 
probability of  remarriage, although neither is significant at conventional 
levels. A more important finding is the very large, negative, and statisti- 
cally significant effect of race. Substantial racial differences in remarriage 
persist even when the effects of  a host of other factors that influence re- 
marriage are taken into account. Evaluated at the means of the indepen- 
dent variables, the predicted five-year remarriage rates are 56 percent for 
whites and 25 percent for blacks. 
Implicit in the labor income regression equation is both an assortative 
mating marriage process and a human capital earnings function. That is, 
we are attempting to predict the labor income of an unmarried woman’s 
prospective spouse. We do so by using information on the women in our 
sample who did remarry and on their new husbands, adjusting the esti- 
mates with Heckman’s technique for the possible nonrepresentativeness 
of that group. Thus, the independent variables in the earnings regression 
18. To correct for extremely low income that may have been the result of an unusual cir- 
cumstance (extended unemployment or illness, etc.), and thus  not representative of long-run 
income, we imposed a minimum income level of $2,000. 447  Economic Consequences of Marital Instability 
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are for the women who remarried, while the dependent variable is the la- 
bor income of their new husbands. It is important to note that this sample 
of men whose incomes are being predicted are not a random sample of all 
men because they are drawn from the pool of men who were eligible to 
marry these women. 
The unadjusted OLS coefficients in table 14.1 reflect the labor income 
behavioral equation as it applies only to the sample of remarried women, 
while those coefficients in the final column, which have been adjusted for 
sample selection bias, can be interpreted as estimates of  population pa- 
rameters applicable to the entire set of  divorced or separated women. In 
both equations it appears that the prospective husband’s labor income is 
most strongly related to the wife’s education and to the income of her ex- 
husband. The estimated coefficient oni  is positive, but it is less than its 
own standard error. The positive coefficient is, however, plausible; it indi- 
cates that those women who do remarry find higher-income spouses than 
would otherwise similar women who did not remarry. With the exception 
of the race and age variables, the other estimated coefficients in the two re- 
gressions are similar to each  other.  The race variable coefficient falls 
sharply from -  .302 to -  .604 when the selection bias adjustment is made. 
That change follows from the positive coefficient on X  and the very nega- 
tive effect of  race on remarriage.  X is itself inversely related to the prob- 
ability of  inclusion in the sample, so black women who remarried must 
have larger values for X  than otherwise identical white women in the sam- 
ple. Since the unobservable traits measured by X  tend to increase the labor 
income of the spouse, failure to account explicitly for this selection effect 
mistakenly attributes that effect to the race variable. When the correction 
is made, the race coefficient becomes more negative, now reflecting the 
opportunities facing an average black woman in the population. This may 
reflect the characteristics of the group of  unmarried black men who are 
potential remarriage partners. Similar reasoning explains the fall in the co- 
efficient on age. 
We can use the two sets of regression results as predictive equations to 
indicate the average husband’s income that could be obtained by different 
groups of women.lg These results are shown in table 14.2. The first col- 
umn shows the actual new husband’s income for women who remarried- 
$8,813 for black women and $15,125 for white. The next two columns give 
the predicted mean values for women who did not remarry, using both the 
unadjusted and adjusted coefficients. The difference between the figures 
in the second and third columns represents the effect of  differences in 
measured characteristics, assuming that those characteristics would affect 
unmarried women exactly as they affected the sample of married women. 
19. To obtain these values, we multiply each coefficient by  the mean value of  each vari- 
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’hble 14.2  Actual and Predicted Mean of Husband’s Income  by Race 
Predicted Husband’s Income 
New Husband’s Income  OLS‘  Adjusted OLSb 
Black women  $  8,813  $  8,292  $4,200 
White women  15,125  13,494  8,408 
‘Based on OLS results from table 14.1. 
bBased on OLS estimates, corrected for selectivity bias. 
The numbers in the second column are lower, but the differential is not 
substantial. The predicted difference for blacks is only 6 percent, reflect- 
ing the fact that in terms of measured traits, remarried and still-divorced 
blacks are not very different. The much lower numbers in the third col- 
umn include the additional effect of differences in the unmeasured traits 
summarized in the h term, now valuing those traits using the parameters 
appropriate for a random person in the population. They also reflect the 
selection bias adjustments in some of the other coefficients, most notably 
race, age, and education. As shown, there is a sharp fall in the predicted 
mean value of husbands’ earnings, especially for black women whose pre- 
dicted value is only 48 percent of the figure for the remarried women. The 
implication is that the opportunities for a woman to increase her standard 
of living through marriage appear to be much worse for currently unmar- 
ried women than for similar women who did remarry. 
A complete assessment of the impact of these low expected amounts of 
husbands’ labor income on remarriage decisions would require building 
them into a model like that of Danziger et al. (1982). We hope to extend 
our work in that direction, but it appears likely that the low expected gains 
from remarriage will go a long way in explaining the low remarriage rates 
of black women. 
14.5  Summary 
A close look at the income and labor supply flows in the years following 
a divorce or separation reveals marked differences in the distribution of 
effects. Most men who divorce or separate are immediately better off be- 
cause they retain most of their labor incomes, typically do not pay large 
amounts of alimony and child support to their ex-wives, and no longer 
have to provide for the level of needs associated with their former fam- 
ilies. On the other hand, women and children involved in divorce are often 
much worse off. The fall is largest in relative terms for women and chil- 
dren whose predivorce incomes were above the median and for black 
women and children. In absolute terms, however, low-income whites and 
especially black children suffer the most. 450  Greg J. DuncanISaul D. Hoffman 
Many of the women and children involved in divorce do improve their 
economic status with time. Half of the low-income whites and blacks rely 
on welfare to a certain extent after the divorce, and considerable numbers 
of whites from both income strata report receiving alimony and child sup- 
port. The average size of these income sources is small, however, relative 
to the amount of  labor income earned by the ex-wives. Labor force par- 
ticipation rates jump substantially for all groups of  women. They ap- 
proach unity for the high-income white women and are well above 50 per- 
cent  for low-income white and black women. The importance of  this 
earned income grows with time following divorce. 
Much more important than growth in an ex-wife’s income is the role of 
a new husband’s labor income if she remarries. More than half of white 
women remarry within five years following a divorce or separation; the 
comparable fraction for black women is less than half. A crucial question 
is whether policies that might encourage the currently unmarried to marry 
would provide the same kind of economic benefits that are enjoyed by the 
women and children who were involved in a remarriage. Estimates from a 
model of the new husband’s labor income, adjusted for selection bias in- 
herent in the process of remarriage, indicate that there is not likely to be as 
much of a benefit for the currently unmarried if they were to remarry. The 
expected labor income of potential husbands of black women averages 
only about $5,000-a  modest amount when compared to the alternatives 
that might be available to her. 
Appendix Tables 
(tables follow on pp. 45 1-466) Tnble 14.A.1  Number of  Observations 
Remained Unmarried  All (includes those who remarried) 
Married in 
r-1  r+l  t+2  t+3  r+4  1+5  1-1  t+l  r+2  t+3  t+4  r+5  t+5 
Women 
All white 
Above median  105  87  77  61  55  48  105  105  105  105  105  105  57 
Below median  104  73  57  47  46  42  104  104  104  104  104  104  62 
37 
All women  349  282  249  220  209  193  349  349  349  349  349  349  156 







77  77  77  77  77  77  56 
89  89  89  89  89  89  70 
36 
250  250  250  250  250  250  162 
-  -  84  -  84  -  84  -  84  -  84-  84 
Children 
All white 
Above median  64  56  47  34  30  27  64  64  64  64  64  64  27 
Below median  117  76  57  42  41  37  117  117  117  117  117  117  80 
41 
All children  363  293  262  231  217  205  363  363  363  363  363  363  158 






All intact couples 
668  668  668  668  668  668  668 
460  460  460  460  460  460  460 
365  365  365  365  365  365  -  365 
1,481  1,481  1,481  1,481  1,481  1,481  1,481 
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Table 14.A.2  Weighted Fraction of  Divorced or Separated Women, Men, 
and Children Who  Were Involved in a Remarriage 
Remarriage Occurred 
1-2  2-3  3-4  4-5  5-6 
Years  Years  Years  Years  Years 
Women 
White  .213  .328  .460  .489  .544 
Black  ,182  .281  .309  .316  .416 
All  .209  .322  .441  .468  ,528 
Men 
White  .394  .551  ,641  ,696  ,761 
Black  .350  .4Q8  .565  .571  ,572 
All  .389  .536  .633  ,682  .741 
Children 
White  ,242  .363  .542  .566  .607 
Black  ,117  .210  .307  .321  ,441 
All  .221  .337  .502  ,524  ,580 
Note: Remarriage  is defined as the acquisition of  a permanent partner, regardless of 
official marital status. Tsble 14.A.3  Family Income Level (in  1981 dollars) 
Remained Unmarried  All (includes those who remarried) 
Married in 
r-1  1+1  t+2  r+3  r+4  t+5  t-1  r+l  t+2  t+3  t+4  t+5  t+5 
~~~~  ~  ~~~  ~~ 
Women 
All white 
Above median  34,756  17,719  17,975  18,762  18,411  17,934  34,576  20,369  22,856  27,457  26,584  28,579  37,994 
Below median  18,282  12,501  12,723  12,807  13,311  13,094  18,282  15,280  15,912  16,376  18,576  18,235  22,264 
All black 
All women 
18,021  9,165  10,308  9,891  9,526  11,385  18,021  10,463  13,204  12,722  12,797  14,283  18,356 







33,508  26,533  28,431  30,728  30,661  31,937  33,762 
18,539  16,843  19,270  19,947  19,925  21,546  22,883 
20,241  19,798  19,643  17,304  22,102  18,720  24,111 







33,960  19,025  17,786  18,929  18,366  18,466  33,960 
16,837  10,376  12,703  13,348  13,507  12,302  16,837 
18,415  10,207  11,165  12,318  11,336  12,110  18,415 

















29,337  37,566 
18,850  22,600 































Nore: Payments made to support outside dependents have been subtracted from income for men. For intact couples, t -  1 is calender year 1969, t 
is 1970, etc. Table 14.A.4  Family Income Relative to t -  1 
Remained Unmarried  All (includes those who remarried) 
Married in 
r-1  t+l  t+2  r+3  t+4  t+5  r-1  t+l  t+2  t+3  t+4  r+5  t+5 
Women 
All white 
Above median  1.0  .61  .64  .69  .68  .69  1  .o  .68  .78  .94  .89  .94  1.16 
Below median  1.0  .88  .85  .76  .75  .74  1.0  1.03  1.08  1.06  1.15  1.13  1.44 
1.08 
All women  1.0  .70  .70  .70  .68  .71  1  .o  .81  .90  .97  .99  1.01  1.27 







1  .o  .82  .91  .95  .97  1.02  1.05 
1.0  1.00  1.22  1.27  1.21  1.31  1.42 
1.04 
1  .o  .93  1.05  1.08  1.09  1.14  1.23 
-  1.0  1.02.98.871.09.97  - 
Children 
All white 
Above median  1.0  .62  .60  .67  .63  .68  1 .o  .69  .76  .85  .85  .92  1.11 




1.0  .73  .68  .72  .68  .72  1  .o  .85  .93  1.02  1.11  1.13  1.42 






All intact couples 
1.0  1.11  1.11  1.04  1.14  1.12 
1.0  1.29  1.26  1.38  1.32  1.53 
-  1.0  1.141.151.22.221.32 
1.0  1.17  1.17  1.17  1.20  1.28 Table 14.A.5  Fraction with Family Income Less Than  Half of t - 1 Level 
Remained Unmarried  All (includes those who remarried) 
Married in 
t-1  t+l  t+2  t+3  t+4  t+5  2-1  t+1  t+2  t+3  t+4  t+5  t+5 
Women 
All white 
Above median  .54  .55  .55  .49  .57  .42  .44  .36  .33  .34  .14 
Below median  .40  .36  .23  .31  .18  .40  .22  .16  .21  .12  .06 
.15 
All women  .47  .47  .43  .43  .39  .38  .33  .28  .28  .24  .ll 






All  men 
.13  .10  .09  .ll  .06  .08 
.18  .10  .13  .10  .ll  .10 
.ll 
.I6  .I1  .13  .ll  .10  .09 







.43  SO  .47  .48  .53  .38  .38  .34  .32  .35  .23 
.43  .37  .08  .26  .21  .30  .25  .12  .20  .13  .08 
.43  .41  .33  3  3 
.43  .43  .29  .37  .33 
---  .05 
.34  .31  .22  .26  .21  .13 






All intact couples 
.02  .02  .05  .05  .05 
.02  .04  .04  .05  .05 
.02  .03  .05  .05  .05 
-  .01  -  .05  2  -0s Table 14.A.6  Fraction with Family Income Higher Than f - 1 Level 
Remained Unmarried  All (includes those who remarried) 
Mamed in 
t-1  t+1  t+2  t+3  t+4  r+5  t-1  t+l  t+2  r+3  r+4  t+S  t+5 
Women 
All white 
Above median  .08  .12  .14  .13  .14  .I2  .22  .35  .34  .34  .52 
Below median  .I6  .13  .14  .14  .17  .32  .36  .38  .43  .40  .61 
All black 
All women 
-  .04A.l5** 
.11  .13  .14  .13  .14 
.39 
.20  .29  .35  .37  .35  .55 







.19  .29  .36  .39  .45  .48 
.35  .43  .46  SO  .57  .63 
.57 
.30  .37  .41  .45  .50  .56 







.I2  .10  .I5  .16  .24 
.17  .14  .09  .17  .03 
-  .14  2  1_?2  -18  2 
.15  .I5  .14  .I7  .16 
.15  .24  .32  .38  .37  .47 
.35  .35  .37  .49  .44  .67 
.56  -  .16  2  -44  4  -  .40 







All intact couples 
.62  .57  .50  .56  .59 
.70  .64  .60  .67  .69 
-  .69  3  3  -64  -62 
.65  .60  .54  .60  .63 Table 14.A.7  Family Income/Needs Level 
Remained Unmarried  All (includes those who remarried) 
Married in 
r-1  r+l  r+2  r+3  r+4  r+5  r-1  r+l  r+2  r+3  r+4  r+5  r+5 
Women 
All white 
Above median  4.7  3.2  3.1  3.3  3.3  3.3  4.7  3.3  3.6  4.1  4.1  4.3  5.3 




3.6  2.6  2.7  2.7  2.7  2.8  3.6  2.7  3.0  3.2  3.3  3.4  4.0 
-  2.3l.5uul.51.8  -  2.3  1.6  1.9  1.9  1.9  2-0  - 
Men 
All white 
Above median  4.6  4.6  5.0  5.1  5.1  5.3  5.1 
Below median  2.8  2.9  3.2  3.2  3.1  3.4  3.4 
3.5 
All men  3.6  3.7  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.2  4.1 
All black  -  2.9  .S  Q  3.4  2.9  - 
Children 
All white 
Above median  4.0  2.5  2.5  2.7  2.6  2.7  4.0  2.8  3.1  3.1  3.2  3.7  4.4 




2.7  1.8  1.9  2.1  2.0  1.9  2.7  2.1  2.2  2.2  2.4  2.6  3 .O 






All intact couples 
5.0  5.4  5.5  5.3  5.7  5.8 
2.5  3.0  2.9  2.8  3.0  3.1 
-  2.7  2.9  3.0  3.0  3.1  3.1 
4.0  4.4  4.4  4.3  4.5  4.7 Table 14.A.8  Family IncomelNeeds  Relative to t -  1 
Remained Unmarried  All (includes those who remamed) 
Mamed in 
1-1  r+l  t+2  t+3  t+4  r+5  t-1  t+l  t+2  t+3  t+4  t+5  t+5 
Women 
All white 
Above median  1.0  .77  .81  .89  .88  .88  1  .o  .SO  .89  1.02  .98  1.04  1.17 
Below median  1.0  1.07  1.04  1.00  .99  1.02  1.0  1.08  1.16  1.12  1.22  1.21  1.36 
All black  -  1.0  -  .71  -  .77  3 3  2 -  1.0  -  .SO  -  .94  3  1.00  1.03  1.13 





AU  black 
All men 
1.0  1.07  1.15  1.16  1.20  1.27  1.20 
1.0  1.12  1.32  1.34  1.28  1.36  1.41 
1.08 
1.0  1.13  1.24  1.24  1.25  1.30  1.29 
-  1.0  po.401.Os1.361.19  - 
Children 
All white 
Above median  1.0  .73  .71  .78  .75  .81  1.0  .76  .84  .85  .87  .96  1.07 
Below median  1  .o  .99  .83  .86  .84  .76  1.0  1.02  1.06  1.12  1.22  1.23  1  SO 
All  black 
All children 
1.20 
1  .o  .84  .78  .83  .78  .82  1  .o  .89  .96  1.00  1.06  1.10  1.31 






All intact couples 
1.0  1.14  1.16  1.13  1.23  1.27 
1.0  1.28  1.25  1.24  1.29  1.34 
1.0  1.19  1.20  1.17  1.26  1.30 
-  1.0  1.151.181.181.251.30 Table 14.A.9  Fraction with Family IncomeiTVeeds Less  Than Half of t- 1 Level 
Remained Unmamed  All (includes those who remarried) 
Married in 




Above median  .31  .29  .22  .18  .26  .29  .25  .17  .16  .23  .20 
Below median  .18  .14  .03  .14  .16  .13  .ll  .10  .12  .15  .15 
.25  All black  -  .32  -31  2  2  -  .27  2  2  2 -  .27 








.06  .06  .02  .03  .04  .04 
.13  .10  .ll  .09  .08  .08 
.ll 
.09  .08  .07  .06  .07  .07 
-  .03  2  -07  -0s  2  - 
~~  ~  ~~~~ 
Children 
All white 
Above median  .26  .24  .21  .12  .34  .26  .18  .16  .10  .23  .15 
Below median  .14  .19  .OO  .20  .20  .ll  .17  .14  .18  .19  .19 
.15 
All children  .23  .24  .14  .21  .25  .20  .20  .I6  .16  .20  .17 






All intact couples 
.01  .02  .03  .03  .04 
.02  .04  .05  .07  .04 
.02  .03  .04  .05  .04 
-  .01  -  .03  -0s  -06  -0s Table 14.A.10  Fraction with Family Income/Needs Higher Than  t - 1 Level 
Remained Unmarried  All (includes those who remarried) 
Married in 







.14  .17  .15  .24  .22 
.34  .30  .32  .45  .44 
-  .20  2  2 2 
.22  .19  .22  .31  .30 
.19  .25  .32  .39  .35  .46 
.38  .41  .43  .54  .52  .58 
.42  -  .28  3  2  3  2 








.53  .55  .56  .57  .57  .so 
.52  .60  .61  .5S  .67  .64 
.53  -  .65  2  -47  -66  2 








.17  .10  .15  .19  .27 
.26  .30  .36  .34  .19 
-  .24  2  &3  2  2 
.22  .22  .26  .25  .24 
.19  .25  .22  .32  .34  .39 
.34  .37  .41  .49  .45  .61 
.35  .28  -40  2  111 
.28  .33  .34  .42  .39  SO 






All intact couples 
.66  .63  .55  .62  .67 
.66  .61  3  .63  .64 
-  .58  2  -61  -  .68  -67 
.66  .62  .56  .63  .66 Table 14.A.11  Fraction Poor 
Remained Unmarried  All (includes those who remarried) 
Married in 
t-1  t+l  t+2  t+3  t+4  t+5  t-1  t+l  t+2  t+3  t+4  t+5  t+5 
Women 
All white 
Above median  .02  .04  .04  .02  .02  .07  .02  .04  .03  .01  .03  .06  .06 




.07  .13  .13  .09  .12  .ll  .07  .ll  .ll  .09  .09  .10  .09 
--  .13  .33  -32  3  -47  3  -  .13  3  2  2  2  -26  - 
Men 
All white 
Above median  .01  .01  .oo  .oo  .oo  .01  .oo 
Below median  .08  .06  .05  .02  .04  .02  .03 
.06  All black  -  .18  -0s  -15  -16  3  - 
All men  .06  .04  .04  33  .03  .03  .02 
Children 
All white 
Abovemedian  .02  .07  .06  .03  .04  .10  .02  .06  .05  .03  .02  .08  .07 




.12  .27  .27  .16  .24  .20  .12  .23  .22  .18  .19  .17  .15 
-  .24  3  3  4  -63  &  -  .24  3  &  3  -45  3  - 
Intact couples 




All intact couples 
.oo  .oo  .oo  .oo  .01  .oo 
.08  .04  .06  .07  .06  .05 
.04  .02  .03  .04  .03  .03 
-  .15  2  3  3  -11 Table 14.A.12  Labor Supply of  Divorced or Separated Women 
Remained Unmanied  All (includes those who remarried) 
Married in 
r-1  t+l  1+2  r+3  r+4  t+5  r-1  t+l  t+2  t+3  t+4  t+5  t+5 






.26  .06  .07  .05  .05  .02  .26  .07  .12  .15  .15  .19  .35 
.39  .28  .24  .21  .23  .28  .39  .29  .29  .32  .32  .36  .43 
-  .42  2 2  3  4 2  -  .42sx.33sB-  .50 
.33  .18  .15  .I5  .17  .15  .33  .19  .21  .23  .24  .28  .39 
Fraction with More Than 1  ,OOO  Work  Hours 
~ 
All white 
Above median  .61  .85  .86  .91  .91  .90  .61  .83  .78  .79  .77  .71  .54 
Below median  .42  .61  .62  .66  .70  .69  .42  .62  .59  .55  .53  .52  .38 
All black  -  .41  -60  &8  Jo  Jo  -63  -  .41  -  .58  3  3  2  2  -  .48 
All women  .51  .73  .74  .77  .77  .78  .51  .72  .68  .66  .65  .62  .47 






7,562  11,327  11,880  12,693  13,422  12,957  7,562  10,709  11,180  11,258  11,019  10,236  7,830 
4,444  6,639  7,671  8,454  9,174  8,668  4,444  6,353  6,680  6,471  6,814  6,342  4,520 
3,370  5,635  6,344  5,057  4,878  7,332  3,370  5,365  6,524  5,363  5,708  6,308  4,868 
5,829  8,937  9,757  10,113  10,603  10,541  5,829  8,350  8,848  8,663  8,723  8,230  6,169 Table 14.A.W  Alimony and Child Support Payments Received by Women and Children 
Remained Unmarried  All (includes those who remarried) 
Manied in 
r-  1  r+l  t+2  r+3  r+4  t+5  r-1  r+l  r+2  t+3  t+4  t+5  r+5 
Fraction Receiving More Than $250 
Women 
All white 
.48  .46  .41  .36  .33  .01  .42  .39  .31  .26  .26  .20  Above median  .01 
Below median  .01  .36  .40  .36  .34  .35  .01  .30  .27  .22  .23  .23  .13 
.01 
.39  .40  .36  .32  .32  .01  .34  .31  .25  .23  .23  .I6  All women  .01 
.17  .14  2 2 2  -  .01  -  .14  2  -12  -  .10  2 -06  --  AU black  - 
Children 
All white 
Above median  .02  .60  .69  .55  .52  .46  .02  .54  .61  .44  .39  .41  .37 
.15  .23  2  121  -  .01  -  .13  3  121  &  -31 
Below median  .oo  .54  .56  .57  SO  .56  .OO  .38  .32  .29  .32  .35  .23 
.39  .40  .34  .32  .37  .29 
--  .01  All black  - 
All children  .01  .49  .55  .49  .45  .47  .01 Pble 14.A.W  (continued) 
Remained Unmanied  All (includes those who remarried) 
Married in 
t-1  r+l  r+2  r+3  t+4  t+5  r-1  r+l  r+2  r+3  r+4  r+5  t+5 
Total Amount of Alimony and Child Support Received (includes zeroes) 
Women 
AU white 
Above median  10  2,425  1,889  1,312  900  746  10  2,143  1,536  1,032  700  583 
Below median  19  940  1,119  1,090  888  764  19  770  762  700  565  509 
AU black 
AU women 
-  9  ---  449  276  486  589  232  9  367  199  375  403  177 
13  1,646  1,423  1,113  847  675  13  1,388  1,070  821  611  505 
Children 
AU white 
Above median  18  3,712  3,403  2,003  1,439  1,085  18  3,349  2,780  1,648  1,223  1,023 
Below median  0  1,685  2,238  2,352  1,487  1,632  0  1,159  1,232  1,233  %7  939 
All black  -  16  389  957  463  1,090  381  -  116  2 366  2  3 2 
All children  26  2,243  2,361  1,891  1,374  1,152  26  1,796  1,639  1,298  1,020  892 lhble 14.A.14  Welfare Receipt 
Remained Unmarried  All (includes those who remarried) 
Married in 
t-1  r+1  t+2  t+3  r+4  t+5  r-1  r+l  t+2  r+3  r+4  t+5  r+5 
Fraction Receiving at Least $250 in Welfare 
Women 
All  white 
Above median 
Below median 
All  black 
All women 
.OO  .03  .04  .06  .04  .04  .OO  .03  .03  .03  .02  .03  .02 
.08  .35  .27  .31  .26  .23  .08  .29  .22  .24  .22  .17  .12 
-  .12  2  Js  3  2  -  .12  3  &  3  -44  2-18 
.05  .21  .18  .22  .20  .18  .05  .19  .15  .17  .15  .13  .08 
Children 
All white 
Above median  .03  .05  .04  .03  .04  .04  .03  .05  .03  .05  .05  .05  .05 
Below median  .10  .50  .45  .33  .34  .34  .10  .41  .37  .31  .34  .25  .19 
.24  .48  .67  .63  .64  .64  -  .24  2  3  3  fi  32  All black 
All children  .10  .32  .33  .29  .30  .30  .I0  .29  .28  .25  .26  .13  .20 
------ Table 14.A.14 (continued) 
Remained Unmarried  All (includes those who remarried) 
Married in 
t-1  r+l  t+2  r+3  t+4  2+5  t-1  r+l  t+2  2+3  t+4  2+5  2+5 
Total Annual Amount Received (includes zeroes) 
Women 
AU white 
Above median  0  73  81  136  108  64  0  61  61  80  60  35  9 
Below median  350  1,586  1,413  1,245  1,169  1,194  350  1,402  1,115  991  875  818  523 
621  2,567  2,250  3,066  2,275  1,763  -  621  2,005  1,948  2,260  2,056  1,206  423 
All women  213  887  847  951  896  733  213  824  704  702  623  484  262 
All black  - 
Children 
AU white 
Above median  244  306  280  120  85  94  244  269  214  236  211  270  403 
Below median  524  2,368  2,291  1,735  1,713  2,046  524  2,103  1,794  1,434  1,267  1,193  705 
AU children  582  1,556  1,696  1,617  1,509  1,379  582  1,514  1,404  1,248  1,105  823  523 
AU  black  1,462  2,457  3,452  3,866  3,344  2,253  1,4622,4942,8272,8682,5421,307107 467  Economic Consequences of Marital Instability 
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Comment  Isabel V.  Sawhill 
Due to the work of a number of analysts, it has now been established that 
changes in family composition are an important reason for flows into and 
Isabel V.  Sawhill is a senior fellow at the Urban Institute. 468  Greg J. Duncan/Saul D. Hoffman 
out of poverty and for changes in economic status more generally. Greg 
Duncan and Saul Hoffman have made significant contributions to  this lit- 
erature in the past, and their current chapter, “Economic Consequences 
of Marital Instability,” is a useful addition to the evolving story. 
The chapter contains a number of important findings. First, women 
and children involved in a divorce or separation experience a substantial 
drop in real economic welfare relative to their economic status before di- 
vorce-a  drop that is  particularly sharp for black women and women 
from higher-income families. This contrasts with men whose economic 
status improves after a divorce. Adjusted for family size, the gains experi- 
enced by divorced males are similar to those experienced by intact fam- 
ilies. Second, after an initial drop in economic status, divorced women 
and their children gradually recoup some of the losses, so that at the end 
of five years they are actually better off than they were the year before di- 
vorce, although not as well off  as women who remained in intact families 
throughout the period. Third, the major reason for these gains is remar- 
riage. Although there is a sharp increase in labor force participation and 
earned income among women after they divorce, those who do not re- 
marry experience little or no gain in income during the five-year period 
following divorce and thus end up considerably worse off than they were 
prior  to divorce.  Fourth, about  half  of  all  women  and  about  three- 
quarters of all men remarry within five years. The probability of remarry- 
ing is much lower for blacks than for whites and for older than for youn- 
ger women. Fifth, there is some evidence that women who remarry have 
more to gain from doing so than women who remain unmarried. Thus, 
one should be cautious about  assuming that  a higher remarriage  rate 
would produce equivalent gains for currently unmarried women. In par- 
ticular, black women’s low remarriage rates appear to be related to the 
fact that the earnings of their prospective husbands are low relative to the 
alternative sources of income available to them. 
These are the substantive findings in a nutshell. A wealth of more de- 
tailed information can be found in the tables. A number of methodolog- 
ical or conceptual wrinkles in the paper also distinguish it from previous 
work. These include the use of a Heckman technique to correct for selec- 
tion bias in the sample of people who remarry, the pooling of observations 
according to  their timing in relation to the event of divorce, and the adop- 
tion of a functional as opposed to a legal definition of marriage and divorce. 
In my comments on the paper, I will focus on five issues: selection bias, 
child care expenses, investment in human capital, remarriage  patterns, 
and policy implications. 
With respect to selection bias, the authors give most of their attention 
to analyzing whether women who remarry are different (in ways that can- 
not be measured) from those who do. They found what appeared to me to 
be no evidence in favor of such selection bias. The estimated coefficient 469  Economic Consequences of Marital Instability 
on the selection bias variable was positive but less than its own standard 
error. In spite of this they give a lot of attention to the results from the 
equation that includes this coefficient, attributing the shift in the race co- 
efficient, for example, to a selection bias effect. I think they are misinter- 
preting what is probably just a case of unstable coefficients. In addition, 
if one is worried about selection bias, this may not be where one should 
look  for it first.  The counterfactual  case for most  of  the analysis of 
changes in the economic well-being of men and women after divorce is, or 
should be, concurrent changes in the economic status of  intact families. 
But suppose that people who divorce are different (either in measurable or 
nonmeasurable ways) from those who do not. Then all of the findings re- 
ported in the tables and summarized above would need to be modified to 
adjust for this fact. 
Another kind of bias present in the authors’ results stems from the fail- 
ure to adjust gross income for child care expenses. If most divorced women 
with  children  have  significant  work-related  expenses  that  their  ex- 
husbands do  not have, and we compare the relative economic status of the 
two groups after divorce without adjusting for this fact, we will underesti- 
mate the differences in net income. The authors are careful to adjust for 
differences in family size and in child support or alimony obligations. Al- 
though not a major omission, child care expenses should ideally be added 
to this list. 
Turning to  the human capital issue, as a member of the “second sex,” I 
find it somewhat depressing that the only way to improve one’s economic 
status after divorce is to find another man. But before I get too gloomy 
about this finding, I would want to see more analysis of how women who 
actually make investments in additional education or new careers after a 
divorce fare relative to those who do not, and what happens beyond the 
first five years. Earnings in the first few years after divorce might actually 
be depressed by a decision to go to school but be higher at a later point in 
time. I doubt that such an analysis would change the basic conclusions of 
this paper but it would be an interesting addition to someone’s future re- 
search agenda. 
Turning to the determinants of remarriage among women, we have not 
advanced far from where we were eight years ago when I first used the 
PSID to examine this question. Other than age and race, there are no ro- 
bust predictors, and the reasons for the large race differential remain elu- 
sive. It might be instructive in this regard to analyze the remarriage rates 
of men to see if  similar patterns hold and to develop better conceptual 
models for both sexes that involve examining transition probabilities be- 
tween different marital states using a more creative set of independent 
variables. Although I doubt that we will ever be able to explain much of 
the observed variation among individuals, we should be able to do better 
than we have to date. 470  Greg J. Duncan/Saul D. Hoffman 
Finally, let me say something about the policy issue that appears to have 
motivated this research. Duncan and Hoffman note that “a crucial ques- 
tion is whether policies that might encourage the currently unmarried to 
marry would provide the same kind of economic benefits that are enjoyed 
by the women and children who were involved in a remarriage” (p. 450). I 
do not think this is the crucial question, or even the right question. It is 
only the Moral Majority, after all, that is advocating using government 
policies to encourage marriage. The right question is whether government 
policies are neutral or whether they are inadvertently destabilizing family 
life. And if the latter, is this a cost we are willing to pay to achieve some 
other benefit such as providing an income floor for dependent children? 
Duncan and Hoffman find weak evidence, at best, that the current AFDC 
program discourages remarriage. In my opinion, this is the issue to which 
more research should be devoted. 
Let me conclude by saying that the authors have provided us with a lot 
of  useful new information, most of  it descriptive, about the economic 
consequences of divorce and separation. I hope they will continue to till 
this particular field because they do it quite well. 